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INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE 1
The Internet Association represents roughly forty leading technology
companies. Its membership includes a broad range of Internet platforms, from
travel sites and online marketplaces to social networking services and search
engines. The Internet Association advances public policy solutions that strengthen
and protect Internet freedoms, foster innovation and economic growth, and
empower small businesses and the public. It respectfully submits this Brief of
Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party to encourage this Court to appropriately
limit its decision to the unique facts of this case so that its decision does not reach
further than necessary or unintentionally disrupt the modern, innovative Internet.

1

In accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 29(a)(4)(E),
amicus certifies that (1) this brief was authored entirely by counsel for amicus
curiae and not by counsel for any party, in whole or part; (2) no party or counsel
for any party contributed money to fund preparing or submitting this brief; and (3)
apart from amicus curiae, its members, and its counsel, no other person contributed
money to fund preparing or submitting this brief.
All parties have consented to the filing of this brief.

1
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INTRODUCTION
This case presents an exceedingly narrow legal question: whether certain
portions of a specific Twitter account are public forums for purposes of the First
Amendment. In particular, it involves a Twitter account that a public official, the
President of the United States, has used “as a channel for communicating and
interacting with the public about his administration.” Stipulation at ¶ 32, Knight
First Amendment Institute at Columbia University v. Trump, No. 17-5205
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2017), ECF No. 30-1 (“Stipulation”). The case considers
whether that public official may, consistent with the First Amendment, “block”
other users’ ability to “repost or respond to [his] messages, and to interact with
other Twitter users in relation to those messages.”

Id. ¶ 13.

To make this

determination, this Court must consider whether the so-called “interactive spaces”
associated with President Trump’s Twitter account—i.e., the spaces “for replies
and retweets created by each tweet sent by the @realDonaldTrump account,”
Knight First Amendment Institute at Columbia University v. Trump, 302 F. Supp.
3d 541, 572 (S.D.N.Y. 2018)—are public forums.
The Internet Association takes no position as to whether President Trump’s
Twitter account is indeed a public forum or whether he violated the First
Amendment by blocking certain users from replying to or re-tweeting his
messages. The Internet Association does, however, respectfully submit that this

2
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Court should carefully, consciously, and conspicuously limit its decision to these
unique facts. In so doing, this Court should emphasize three points to prevent any
confusion about the rights and legal responsibilities of Internet platforms, accountholders, and other users.
First, this Court should make clear that this case does not implicate the
overwhelming majority of social media accounts throughout the Internet. In fact, it
does not implicate the overwhelming majority of Twitter accounts and “interactive
spaces” located throughout Twitter. “Twitter is a social media platform with more
than 300 million active users worldwide, including some 70 million in the United
States.” Stipulation at ¶ 13. But only an extremely small number of those 70
million American users are public officials or government entities. Critically,
Twitter accounts held by public officials or governmental entities are differently
situated than other accounts. Unlike President Trump’s Twitter account, there can
be no serious argument that a non-public official’s account is owned or controlled
by the government—a key prerequisite for establishing a public forum. Thus, even
if this Court were to conclude that the “interactive space” connected to a public
official’s Twitter account may be a public forum in certain circumstances, that
holding would not apply to the tens of millions of other active Twitter accounts.
Second, despite this crucial difference between President Trump’s Twitter
account and the accounts of non-public officials, they do share one thing in

3
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common: all Twitter accounts are subject to Twitter’s Terms of Service. Twitter
is the owner and controller of the “property” that might constitute a public forum
here.

Despite any First Amendment status that this Court might find in the

“interactive spaces” associated with President Trump’s account, Twitter retains
authority to revoke access to both his account and the account of any user seeking
to comment on President Trump’s account. Twitter similarly retains authority to
remove any content in that “interactive space.”

Although the district court

acknowledged this in passing—“Twitter also maintains control over the
@realDonaldTrump account (and all other Twitter accounts),” Knight First
Amendment Institute, 302 F. Supp. 3d at 567—this Court should expressly
acknowledge this essential fact to avoid subsequent confusion in this everdeveloping area of law.
Third, Twitter is not a state actor for the purpose of the First Amendment. It
is “elementary constitutional doctrine that the first amendment only restrains action
undertaken by the Government.” Buckley v. American Fed’n of Television and
Radio Artists, 496 F.2d 305, 309 (2d Cir. 1974).

But Twitter is not the

Government. Because this case involves only a miniscule proportion of Twitter’s
more than 300 million users, and because Twitter itself is the ultimate owner of all
of the space on its platform, there is a considerable risk that any decision that may
recognize isolated public forums on Twitter will be misunderstood to hold that

4
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Twitter, too, can be subject to First Amendment scrutiny. This Court should bear
in mind that, despite the idiosyncratic facts of this case, Twitter itself is not a state
actor when it blocks or withdraws access to its account-holders or users, and it is
therefore not subject to the First Amendment’s restraints.
At bottom, the Internet Association advocates simply that “[i]n considering
the application of unchanging constitutional principles to new and rapidly evolving
technology, this Court should proceed with caution.” Brown v. Entertainment
Merchants Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 806 (2011) (Alito, J., concurring). More than two
decades ago, a plurality of the Supreme Court similarly cautioned that it was “not
at all clear that the public forum doctrine should be imported wholesale” into a
“new and changing area”—then, the innovative area of cable television. Denver
Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 749 (1996). Now
faced with another cutting-edge technology, this Court should be equally cautious
when making decisions at the crossroads of private property and an asserted public
forum.

Here, that cautious approach counsels in favor of ensuring that any

decision is expressly limited to the exceptional facts of this case.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE VAST MAJORITY OF TWITTER ACCOUNTS CANNOT BE
DEEMED PUBLIC FORUMS.
If this Court concludes that appellees have Article III standing to raise their

First Amendment claims, a central question in this appeal is whether the
5
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“interactive spaces” connected to President Trump’s Twitter account are public
forums. “Because facilities or locations deemed to be public forums are usually
operated by governments, determining that a particular facility or location is a
public forum usually suffices to render the challenged action taken there to be state
action subject to First Amendment limitations.”

Halleck v. Manhattan Cmty.

Access Corp., 882 F.3d 300, 306-07 (2d Cir. 2018). Here, however, the asserted
public forum is not owned by the government. It is a small piece of cyberspace on
a platform owned and controlled by Twitter that is associated with an account
operated by a public official. This unique scenario raises the question whether
those particular “interactive spaces” “have a sufficient connection to governmental
authority to be deemed” public forums. Id. at 307.
Public forum analysis typically applies only to spaces that are owned and
therefore controlled by the government. E.g., Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the
Univ. of Cal., Hastings College of the Law v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 679 (2010)
(“[I]n a progression of cases, this Court has employed forum analysis to determine
when a governmental entity, in regulating property in its charge, may place
limitations on speech.” (emphasis added)); West Farms Assocs. v. State Traffic
Comm’n of State of Conn., 951 F.2d 469, 473 (2d Cir. 1991) (“[P]ublic forum
analysis applies only where a private party seeks access to public property, such as

6
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a park, a street corner, or school auditorium, in order to communicate ideas to
others.”).
But in rare occasions, courts have applied the public forum doctrine to
property the government temporarily controls, but does not own. In Southeastern
Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975), for example, the Supreme Court
applied the public forum analysis to real property that was temporarily under
government control, holding that a “privately owned . . . theater under long-term
lease to the city” was a public forum for First Amendment purposes. Id. at 547,
552.
Courts have also applied public forum analysis to privately-owned media
outlets that are subject to extensive government regulation. For example, this
Court recently held that a privately-owned public access television station was a
public forum. Halleck, 882 F.3d at 300. This Court made clear, however, that its
holding was fact-dependent. Halleck stated that where
federal law authorizes setting aside channels for public access to be
“the electronic marketplace of ideas,” state regulation requires cable
operators to provide at least one public access channel, a municipal
contract requires a cable operator to provide four such channels, and a
municipal official has designated a private corporation to run those
channels, those channels are public forums.
Id. at 306.

Based on this specific “statutory, regulatory, and contractual

framework,” this Court concluded that the public access channel at issue was, in
fact, a public forum. Id. The Court declined, however, to “determin[e] whether a
7
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public access channel is necessarily a public forum simply by virtue of its function
in providing an equivalent of the public square.” Id.
In addition, at least one court (other than the district court below) has held
that interactive spaces on privately owned websites may constitute a public forum.
In Davison v. Loudoun County Board of Supervisors, 267 F. Supp. 3d 702 (E.D.
Va. 2017), a district court held that a Facebook page belonging to the Chair of the
Loudoun County Board of Supervisors—the local governing body for Loudoun,
County, Virginia—was a public forum. In that case, the record included 100
examples of the Chair’s Facebook posts, “nearly all of which relate directly or
indirectly to [her] public office.” Id. at 714 n.3. The Court observed that “[t]here
is comparably little evidence of posts of a more personal nature.” Id. In addition,
the Court explained that the Chair had “affirmatively solicited comments from her
constituents” on issues of public importance. Id. at 716. Based on these facts, the
Court concluded that the public official had opened up her Facebook page as a
public forum.
This Court will no doubt wrestle with these same considerations as it
evaluates whether President Trump’s Twitter account qualifies as a public forum.
Again, the Internet Association takes no position on that question. But no matter
how this Court decides that issue in the narrow context of President Trump’s

8
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account, it can—and should—easily conclude that the vast majority of Twitter
accounts are not public forums.
Most straightforwardly, tens of millions of Twitter accounts are not operated
by government entities or public officials.

That fact alone demonstrates that

virtually all of the space on Twitter cannot be deemed a public forum (and
therefore will not be controlled by the Court’s decision in this case). See generally
Gov’t Opening Br. at 32 (“To the extent that Twitter provides the means for
conversations among its many users, Twitter as a whole could be characterized as a
private forum for public expression—though not a ‘public forum’ in the First
Amendment sense, given its non-governmental character.”).
President Trump’s history with Twitter provides a perfect illustration.
President Trump first opened his Twitter account in 2009 when he was a private
citizen. For years, Citizen Trump used that account to offer his opinions “about a
variety of topics, including popular culture and politics.” Stipulation ¶ 32. There
is no debate in this case that had President Trump remained Citizen Trump, his
private Twitter account—and the “interactive spaces” connected to it—could not
be a public forum. The narrow question before this Court is whether that Twitter
account became a public forum when President Trump took office and began using
it for governmental purposes.

9
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Even if public officials have and use Twitter accounts, moreover, they may
not use those accounts for government business, in which case there would be no
basis for finding that the account was controlled by the government. Here, the
district court found it significant that “President Trump sometimes uses the account
to announce matters related to official government business before those matters
are announced to the public through other official channels,” 2 and that “[t]he
National Archives and Records Administration has advised the White House that
the President’s tweets from @realDonaldTrump . . . are official records that must
be preserved under the Presidential Records Act.”

Knight First Amendment

Institute, 302 F. Supp. 3d at 553 (citing Stipulation ¶¶ 38, 40). Likewise, the court
in Davison emphasized that the public official used her Facebook account to make
statements about public affairs and to invite comments from constituents. See 267
F. Supp. 3d at 716 & n.4. But very few account-holders are public officials who
use their Twitter accounts to officially announce government policy about things

2

See Stipulation ¶ 38 (stipulating that “President Trump uses
@realDonaldTrump, often multiple times a day, to announce, describe, and defend
his policies; to promote his Administration’s legislative agenda; to announce
official decisions; to engage with foreign political leaders; to publicize state visits;
to challenge media organizations whose coverage of his Administration he believes
to be unfair; and for other statements, including on occasion statements unrelated
to official government business.”).

10
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like the ability of transgender individuals to serve in the military, 3 sensitive
diplomatic and national security issues, 4 the formal resignation of Cabinet
Secretaries, 5 and other official government actions.
These facts demonstrate the narrowness of the issue before this Court. Few
Twitter accounts are operated by government officials, and even fewer are devoted
to public use. When deciding whether President Trump’s account is a public
forum, this Court should expressly state that its decision does not affect virtually
all of the other accounts or “interactive spaces” on Twitter (and other Internet
Association members’ platforms) for which there would be no basis to find
ownership or control by the government—a prerequisite to any public forum
analysis. 6

3

Stipulation ¶ 41 (“For example, on July 26, 2017, President Trump issued a
series of tweets . . . announcing ‘that the United States Government will not accept
or allow . . . Transgender individuals to serve . . . .’”).
4

Stipulation ¶¶ 15, 21.

5

Knight First Amendment Institute, 302 F. Supp. 3d at 553 (“Since the
parties’ stipulation, the President has also used the @realDonaldTrump account in
removing then-Secretary of State Rex Tillerson and then-Secretary of Veterans
Affairs David Shulkin.”).
6

Regardless of how it rules, the Court also should affirm the district court’s
recognition that “the @realDonaldTrump account as a whole” is not “the would-be
forum.” Knight First Amendment Institute, 302 F. Supp. 3d at 566. “Plaintiffs do
not seek access to the account as a whole—they do not desire the ability to send
tweets as the President, the ability to receive notifications that the President would
receive, or the ability to decide who the President follows on Twitter.” Id.

11
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II.

TWITTER RETAINS CONTROL OVER TWITTER ACCOUNTS
AND ANY ASSOCIATED “INTERACTIVE SPACES.”
The district court correctly noted that “Twitter is a private (though publicly

traded) company that is not government-owned.”

Knight First Amendment

Institute, 302 F. Supp. 3d at 566. It also correctly observed that Twitter “maintains
control over the @realDonaldTrump account (and all other Twitter accounts).” Id.
at 567. But the district court did not take these observations to their logical and
necessary conclusions: (1) Twitter may remove or “block” a would-be commenter
in the “interactive space,” even if this Court decides that a public official accountholder may not do so; and (2) Twitter can suspend or disable that public official’s
account, thereby eliminating the ability for anyone to participate in its associated
“interactive space.” While these conclusions were perhaps implicit in the district
court’s decision, this Court should make them explicit in its opinion on appeal,
regardless of how it decides the other questions at issue.
These conclusions ineluctably flow from the terms of Twitter’s User
Agreement. That Agreement unambiguously provides that it “may suspend or
terminate your account or cease providing you with all or part of the Services at

Plaintiffs challenge only the constitutionality of President Trump’s decision to
block the individual plaintiffs from the @realDonaldTrump account, and all they
seek is a declaration that blocking the individual plaintiffs was unconstitutional and
an injunction requiring the defendants to unblock the individual plaintiffs. This
further demonstrates what a small plot of Twitterspace is at issue here.

12
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any time

for

any or

no

reason.”

Twitter

Terms

of

Service, at

https://twitter.com/en/tos (emphasis added). Likewise, those Terms of Service
provide that Twitter “reserve[s] the right to remove Content that violates the User
Agreement,

including

for

example,

copyright

impersonation, unlawful conduct, or harassment.”

or

trademark

violations,

Id.; see Twitter Rules and

Policies, at https://help.twitter.com/en/rules-and-policies#twitter-rules.

Taken

together, these provisions leave no doubt that any public forums that may exist in
“interactive spaces” on Twitter’s platform are subject to Twitter’s control.
Courts have not faced a situation where a private actor with control over its
property revokes access to a government actor operating a potential public forum
on that property. But here, Twitter’s ability to revoke access to a public official’s
account without violating the First Amendment stems from the kind of public
forum that may exist on Twitter.
“The Supreme Court has recognized three types of fora across a spectrum of
constitutional protection for expressive activity”: traditional public forums,
designated public forums, and nonpublic forums. Make the Rd. by Walking, Inc. v.
Turner, 378 F.3d 133, 142 (2d Cir. 2004). As the district court rightly held,
Twitter’s “interactive spaces” cannot be “traditional public forums,” i.e., “places
which by long tradition or by government fiat have been devoted to assembly and
debate, [where] the rights of the state to limit expressive activity are sharply

13
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circumscribed.” Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n , 460 U.S. 37,
45 (1983); Knight First Amendment Institute, 302 F. Supp. 3d at 574 (“[W]e can
first conclude that the interactive space of a tweet sent by @realDonaldTrump is
not a traditional public forum. There is no historical practice of the interactive
space of a tweet being used for public speech and debate since time immemorial,
for there is simply no extended historical practice as to the medium of Twitter.”).
Consequently, this Court must consider whether, in these unique
circumstances, Twitter’s interactive spaces are “designated public forums,”
“nonpublic forums,” or no forum at all. E.g., Arkansas Educ. Television Comm’n
v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 678-79 (1998).

In any of those categories, the

government itself has the ability to revoke access to the forum or change the nature
of the forum. For example, even in “designated public forums,” the Supreme
Court has recognized that “a state is not required to indefinitely retain the open
character of” a particular forum. Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 46. As a logical
matter, that is enough for this Court to find that Twitter can revoke a would-be retweeter’s access to a designated public forum (the “interactive space” connected to
an account)—or the forum itself (the account-holder’s Twitter account itself).
After all, by agreeing to Twitter’s Terms of Service as a condition of opening an
account, a public official necessarily agrees that Twitter can extinguish the “open
character” of the “interactive spaces” associated with her account. Id. Thus,

14
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because “the government may decide to close a designated public forum,” Make
the Rd. by Walking, 378 F.3d at 143, it also may agree to permit underlying private
property owners to close that forum. Nothing in law or logic suggests that the
government cannot delegate the forum-closing decision to someone else—
particularly when the other entity is the actual owner of the forum’s property.
Accordingly, even if the Court concludes that elements of the @realDonaldTrump
account constitute a public forum, nothing about that holding would prevent
Twitter from continuing to exercise control over that account and access to the
“interactive spaces” associated with it under the plain terms of its User
Agreement. 7

7

The Knight Institute makes a different claim than the private plaintiffs. It
does not wish to interact directly with President Trump’s Twitter account. Instead,
it wants to “read comments that otherwise would have been posted by the blocked
Plaintiffs . . . in direct reply to @realDonaldTrump tweets.” Stipulation ¶ 61. But
the Knight Institute would have no First Amendment claim against Twitter if
Twitter were to disable a public official’s account or otherwise remove content in
“interactive spaces” associated with that account. “The right to receive
information in the free speech context is merely the reciprocal of the right of the
speaker.” Bicknell v. Vergennes Union High Sch. Bd. of Dirs., 475 F. Supp. 615,
620 (D. Vt. 1979) (citing Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 757 (1976)). Here, any Twitter account-holder’s
right to speak (or, as here, reply or re-tweet) is subject to Twitter’s ultimate
control. Accordingly, the Knight Institute has no First Amendment right to read
content on Twitter if Twitter determines that this content should be removed under
its Terms of Service. Relatedly, as explained below in Section III, Twitter is not a
state actor. As such, the Knight Institute would have no First Amendment claim
against Twitter.

15
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III.

TWITTER IS NOT A “STATE ACTOR.”
The foregoing sections establish two principles:

(1) Twitter is private

property, operated by private citizens for private purposes, and the overwhelming
majority of it cannot be deemed a public forum; and (2) Twitter retains ultimate
control over its platform and thus can freely remove accounts or block content in
“interactive spaces.” Given Twitter’s complete control over these communicative
spaces, it is possible that some will assert that Twitter itself is a “state actor”
subject to First Amendment constraints.

It is not.

Relatedly, if this Court

concludes that certain “interactive spaces” on Twitter are public forums, some may
mistakenly assert that Twitter itself is a state actor for First Amendment purposes
when it takes action as to content in those public spaces. It is not. This Court
should be especially careful to avoid creating confusion on these important issues.
The First Amendment’s “guarantee of free speech is a guarantee only against
abridgment by government, federal or state.” Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507,
513 (1976). To the extent the law “extend[s] protection or provide[s] redress
against a private corporation or person who seeks to abridge the free expression of
others” that protection is a product of common law or statute—not the
Constitution. Id.; Halleck, 882 F.3d at 304 (“Because [Defendant] is a private
corporation, the viability of the Plaintiffs’ First Amendment claim against it and its
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employees depends on whether [Defendant’s] actions can be deemed state
action.”). 8
A private company like Twitter may be treated as a state actor only:
(1) [when] the entity acts pursuant to the “coercive power” of the state
or is “controlled” by the state (“the compulsion test”); (2) when the
state provides “significant encouragement” to the entity, the entity is a
“willful participant in joint activity with the [s]tate,” or the entity’s
functions are “entwined” with state policies (“the joint action test” or
“close nexus test”); or (3) when the entity “has been delegated a
public function by the [s]tate,” (“the public function test”).
Sybalski v. Independent Grp. Home Living Program, Inc., 546 F.3d 255, 257 (2d
Cir. 2008) (quoting Brentwood Acad. v. Tennessee Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n,
531 U.S. 288, 296 (2001)). As explained below—and as courts have consistently

8

In the ordinary public forum case, there is no need to separately consider
the application of these rules. As this Court recently explained, “[b]ecause
facilities or locations deemed to be public forums are usually operated by
governments, determining that a particular facility or location is a public forum
usually suffices to render the challenged action taken there to be state action
subject to First Amendment limitations.” Halleck, 882 F.3d at 306-07; see Knight
First Amendment Institute, 302 F. Supp. 3d at 568 (same); Prager Univ. v. Google
LLC, No. 17-CV-06064-LHK, 2018 WL 1471939, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2018)
(noting that Supreme Court’s cases considering “private property dedicated to
public use” had “addressed whether certain speech restrictions enacted by the
federal government violated the First Amendment” (citation omitted)). Put
differently, when a space is a public forum, it generally means that the government
not only has control over that space, but that it exercises exclusive control. As
explained above, however, that is not true here because Twitter retains control over
all spaces on its platform under the terms of its User Agreement.
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concluded 9—private social media companies’ operation and regulation of their
own platforms do not satisfy any of these tests. Such companies are, therefore, not
state actors and their activities do not trigger First Amendment scrutiny, even if a
court were to find that certain “interactive spaces” on Twitter qualify as public
forums, and even when Twitter takes action as to the content in those spaces.

9

See, e.g., Prager Univ., 2018 WL 1471939, at *8 (holding that YouTube
and Google were not “state actors that must regulate the content on their privately
created website in accordance with the strictures of the First Amendment”);
Nyabwa v. FaceBook, No. 2:17-CV-24, 2018 WL 585467, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 26,
2018) (“Because the First Amendment governs only governmental restrictions on
speech, Nyabwa has not stated a cause of action against FaceBook.”); Shulman v.
Facebook.com, No. CV 17-764 (JMV), 2017 WL 5129885, at *4 (D.N.J. Nov. 6,
2017) (“The Court also notes that efforts to apply the First Amendment to
Facebook . . . have consistently failed.”); Forbes v. Facebook, Inc., No. 16 CV 404
(AMD), 2016 WL 676396, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 18, 2016) (“Facebook is a private
corporation, and Mr. Forbes does not allege any facts that could support a claim of
a ‘close nexus’ between Facebook and the state, such that Facebook’s actions (or
inaction) may be fairly attributable to the state.”); Doe v. Cuomo, No. 10-CV-1534
(TJM/CFH), 2013 WL 1213174, at *9 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2013) (Facebook not
state actor under joint action test); Kinderstart.com LLC v. Google, Inc., No. C 062057 JF (RS), 2007 WL 831806, at *14 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2007) (concluding
Google was not state actor); see also, e.g., Green v. America Online (AOL), 318
F.3d 465, 472 (3d Cir. 2003) (“AOL is a private, for profit company and is not
subject to constitutional free speech guarantees. . . . We are unpersuaded by
Green’s contentions that AOL is transformed into a state actor because AOL
provides a connection to the Internet on which government and taxpayer-funded
websites are found, and because AOL opens its network to the public whenever an
AOL member accesses the Internet and receives email or other messages from
non-members of AOL.”); Howard v. America Online Inc., 208 F.3d 741, 754 (9th
Cir. 2000) (concluding that AOL was not a state actor where plaintiffs had argued
that “AOL is a ‘quasi-public utility’ that ‘involv[es] a public trust’”).
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As an initial matter, private social media platforms like Twitter do not
operate pursuant to government control. The government has no involvement in
Twitter’s product design, hiring, advertising sales, raising money, or any of its
other basic corporate functions. And most relevant here, Twitter enforces its
Terms of Service independent of the government. Accordingly, there can be no
legitimate claim that the government “exercises ‘coercive power,’ is ‘entwined in
[the] management or control’ of [Twitter], or provides [Twitter] with ‘significant
encouragement, either overt or covert,’” nor is there any reasonable argument that
Twitter “‘operates as a willful participant in joint activity with the State or its
agents.’” Cranley v. National Life Ins. Co. of Vermont, 318 F.3d 105, 112 (2d Cir.
2003) (quoting Brentwood Acad., 531 U.S. at 296). 10
Nor can courts reasonably conclude that Twitter can be treated as a state
actor under the “public function” test. Under this test, “‘[s]tate action may be
found in situations where an activity that traditionally has been the exclusive, or
near exclusive, function of the State has been contracted out to a private entity.’”
10

To be sure, determining whether a private entity is a state actor is a
“necessarily fact-bound inquiry.” Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 939
(1982). But in the social media and Internet context, there is no indication of any
“‘interdependence,’ ‘symbiosis,’ or ‘nexus’” with the government. Jensen v.
Farrell Lines, Inc., 625 F.2d 379, 382 (2d Cir. 1980). Absent that kind of
government connection or control, no court can reasonably conclude that social
media platforms like Twitter are state actors under the government control prong
of the “state action” test.
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Grogan v. Blooming Grove Volunteer Ambulance Corps, 768 F.3d 259, 264-65 (2d
Cir. 2014) (quoting Horvath v. Westport Library Ass’n, 362 F.3d 147, 151 (2d Cir.
2004)). As the Supreme Court has cautioned, however, “[w]hile many functions
have been traditionally performed by governments, very few have been
“exclusively reserved to the State.” Flagg Bros, Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 158
(1978).

“[C]ourts have found state action when private parties perform such

sovereign functions as medical care for prison inmates; holding local primary
elections; animal control; operation of a post office; and . . . fire protection.”
Grogan, 768 F.3d at 265 (internal citations omitted).

Internet platforms like

Twitter do not serve anything remotely comparable to these public functions.
Nevertheless, some have tried to argue that social media websites satisfy the
“public function” test because they hold out their private property as spaces for
open public discourse. See, e.g., Prager Univ. v. Google LLC, No. 17-CV-06064LHK, 2018 WL 1471939, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2018) (“Plaintiff emphasizes
that Defendants hold YouTube out ‘as a public forum dedicated to freedom of
expression to all’ and argues that ‘a private property owner who operates its
property as a public forum for speech is subject to judicial scrutiny under the First
Amendment.’” (quoting Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at
18, Prager Univ. v. Google LLC, No. 5:17-cv-06064-LHK (N.D. Cal. Feb. 9,
2018), ECF No. 33)). These plaintiffs have attempted to support their novel theory
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with the Supreme Court’s decisions in Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946),
and Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730 (2017).

In Marsh, the

Supreme Court concluded that the First Amendment prohibited a private “company
town” from imposing criminal punishment on individuals distributing religious
literature. In so doing, the Court loosely stated that the “more an owner, for his
advantage, opens up his property for use by the public in general, the more do his
rights become circumscribed by the statutory and constitutional rights of those who
use it.” Marsh, 326 U.S. at 506. Seventy years later, Packingham described social
media sites as “the modern public square” because they provide a space for “users
to gain access to information and communicate with one another about it on any
subject that might come to mind.” Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1737. Based on
these two decisions, some have asserted that social media platforms are modernday “company towns” and therefore must comply with First Amendment strictures
like the town in Marsh.
This argument finds no support in precedent, and it has, unsurprisingly, been
soundly rejected. E.g., Prager Univ., 2018 WL 1471939, at *5-8. A series of postMarsh Supreme Court opinions limited that case to its facts, explaining that private
property can “be treated as though it were public” only where “that property has
taken on all the attributes of a town, i.e., ‘residential buildings, streets, a system of
sewers, a sewage disposal plant and a ‘business block’ on which business places
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are situated.’” Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. at 159 (quoting Amalgamated Food Emp.
Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308, 332 (1968) (Black, J.,
dissenting)); Prager Univ., 2018 WL 1471939, at *8 (noting that Supreme Court’s
post-Marsh decisions clarified that it “‘was never intended to apply’ outside ‘the
very special situation of a company-owned town’” (quoting Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner,
407 U.S. 551, 562-63 (1972)). Social media sites offer their users a wide array of
functions, but they are a long way from “tak[ing] on all the attributes” of a
municipality. Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. at 159 (emphasis added).
And, for all of Packingham’s broad language, it “did not, and had no
occasion to, address whether private social media corporations like [Twitter] are
state actors that must regulate the content of their websites according to the
strictures of the First Amendment.” Prager Univ., 2018 WL 1471939, at *8; see
also Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1738 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment) (noting
agreement with Court’s holding but explaining that “I cannot join the opinion of
the Court . . . because of its undisciplined dicta”). Instead, the issue before the
Court was whether a North Carolina law violated the First Amendment because it
prohibited sex offenders from all forms of social media. Thus, the critical feature
of Packingham is that it involved a State taking action that the First Amendment
barred. Packingham in no way suggested that the First Amendment barred a
private entity like Twitter from limiting or completely prohibiting an individual’s
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use of its platform. Put simply, Packingham did not hold that private Internet
companies were subject to First Amendment scrutiny as state actors, or that those
private Internet companies could not prevent users from accessing their websites.
E.g., Nyabwa v. FaceBook, No. 2:17-CV-24, 2018 WL 585467, at *1 (S.D. Tex.
Jan. 26, 2018) (“Although the Court recognized in Packingham . . . that social
media sites like Facebook and Twitter have become the equivalent of a public
forum for sharing ideas and commentary, the Court did not declare a cause of
action against a private entity such as Facebook for a violation of the free speech
rights protected by the First Amendment.”).
In sum, for all of their control over their own property, social media
platforms are not state actors for First Amendment purposes. Nor are they state
actors because they play a vital role in modern public discourse. Even if this Court
finds that certain pockets of Twitter are public forums, and even if this Court finds
that government actors who operate Twitter accounts are restrained by the First
Amendment, it should make clear that Twitter itself is not similarly restrained. 11
11

Like the district court below, the Internet Association assumes that “‘it is
substantially likely that the President and other executive . . . officials would abide
by an authoritative interpretation of [a] . . . constitutional provision.’” Knight First
Amendment Institute, 302 F. Supp. 3d at 579 (quoting Franklin v. Massachusetts,
505 U.S. 788, 803 (1992)). As such, it need not opine on the proper remedy in this
case. That said, it is important to emphasize that, if this Court were to conclude
that President Trump violated the First Amendment by blocking the individual
plaintiffs from the “interactive space” on his Twitter account, it could not order
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should carefully limit its opinion to the
unique facts of this case and expressly make clear that: (1) only a small portion of
Twitter is even arguably a public forum; (2) Twitter retains control over its private
property under the terms of its User Agreement and can remove users or block
content in its own discretion; and (3) when taking such actions, Twitter is not
subject to First Amendment scrutiny because it is not a state actor.
Respectfully submitted,
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Twitter to unblock the individual plaintiffs as a means of effectuating that
constitutional decision. See, e.g., Hassell v. Bird, 420 P.3d 776 (Cal. 2018).
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